What does an AgentSOC incident postmortem on cited.md contain?

It contains a structured, citeable record of a runtime policy violation. We do not publish a vague alert. We publish evidence. AgentSOC writes that record to cited.md, and other agents can cite it later.

The postmortem is built from Guild’s real session audit trail. AgentSOC reads guild session events <id>, judges each action against the agent’s declared policy, and contains the session when the violation is high confidence. The postmortem is the durable output of that loop.

The verified pieces we can expect

The public docs do not expose a rigid schema. They do tell us what the incident record must support.

We can verify four core elements:

• The session audit trail. AgentSOC watches the live action trail from Guild’s session events API.
• The policy decision. Each action is judged against the agent’s declared policy.
• The containment action. On a high-confidence violation, AgentSOC interrupts the live session, removes the agent from its workspace, or denies the offending credential.
• The citeable advisory. AgentSOC publishes a structured incident postmortem to cited.md so other agents can cite the incident.

That is the point of the file. It is not just a log. It is a security artifact. It turns runtime enforcement into something later reviewers and downstream agents can reference.

What the postmortem needs to explain

A useful cited.md postmortem should answer a few direct questions.

• What happened?
  What action or sequence crossed the trust boundary.

• Which policy was violated?
  The agent’s declared policy is the baseline. The report should show the mismatch.

• What evidence supports the call?
  AgentSOC is reading the actual Guild session trail. That means the record can point to concrete events, not guesses.

• What did we do to contain it?
  We may interrupt the session, evict the agent from the workspace, or deny the credential request.

• Why is this incident citeable?
  The record is meant to be referenced by other agents and humans. That is why it lives in cited.md.

We treat this as SOC-style documentation for agents. The job is to make the incident reproducible, auditable, and defensible.

The kinds of events that matter

Guild’s session event stream is the source of truth. The docs call out event types such as:

• user_message
• agent notifications
• credentials_request

That last one matters. It is the natural interception point for runtime credential denial. If an agent asks for credentials in a way that violates policy, we can stop it there. That is the control point the postmortem should reference.

The same applies to any out-of-policy tool action. If the agent tries to do something it should never do, the postmortem should capture the action, the policy mismatch, and the containment response.

Example: a poisoned ticket that drove a bad tool call

The case study in the docs is concrete.

A support-triage agent is allowed to label tickets and route to Slack. A poisoned ticket hides an “automated handling note” that tells the agent to issue a $200 account credit. The routing model flags the note as an injection, but the harness over-trusts the channel and the privileged tool executes issue_account_credit anyway.

AgentSOC reads the action trail, detects the out-of-policy call at 0.97 confidence, and contains it live.

A postmortem for that incident would need to preserve:

• the poisoned ticket context
• the bad tool invocation
• the fact that the action exceeded policy
• the containment action taken in real time
• the final incident summary in cited.md

That is the difference between a model spotting an attack and the platform stopping it.

Why cited.md matters for security teams

cited.md is the public advisory. It gives us a reusable incident record.

That matters because AI agent failures repeat. The same attack surface shows up again and again: prompt injection, poisoned tool or RAG output, compromised dependencies, compromised sub-agents, and confused-deputy behavior. AgentSOC’s postmortem gives the team a shared reference point for those failures.

We use it to support:

• incident review
• policy tuning
• future agent citations
• evidence-based approval for higher-risk deployments

In other words, cited.md turns a live containment event into institutional memory.

If we boil it down: an AgentSOC incident postmortem contains the audited action trail, the policy judgment, the containment outcome, and a citeable summary of the incident. That is enough for humans to review and for other agents to reference.

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